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Without the slightest doubt our twentieth century civilization is a 
technological one. Techriology today has expanded rapidly and is 
practically universal both in acceptance and its influence. One need only 
recall a few modern inventions in order to establish its well-nigh 
ubiquitous proliferation at least throughout the so-called civilized world: 
microwaves, freezers, refrigerators, televisions, radios, stereos, videos, 
recorders, telephones and movie-cameras within the precincts of the 
home; medical instruments and highly sophisticated equipment of al1 
sorts in hospitals; computers in schools, business, and government; 
automated factories with robots replacing humans in at times dangerous, 
tedious, or even ordinary, work; gigantic grain-elevators and other 
mechanical equipment in our farms; slow-moving automobiles, air-pla- 
nes, ocean cruisers, and high-speed supersonic air-planes like the 
Concord; atomic submariines and al1 sorts of nuclear weaponry; and last 
but not least man-made earth-satellites circling the heavens both for 
peaceful and military purposes. These and many other creations of 
modern technology have become quite common, certainly at least so in 
the materially more affluent and industrialized nations of the Western 
world. Their widespread presence is such that young people find it nearly 
impossible to imagine the world as it was not more than eighty years 
ago, indeed not more than fifty years ago when began the almost sudden 
expansion of modern technology which we have witnessed in our 
lifetimes. With no more than three or four exceptions, most of the items 
just mentioned were then only in the planning stage. They could be read 
about only in the science-fiction literature. A result of these many 
inventions, which technology has made a reality, has been that the planet 
we inhabit is very different from what it was early in this century, as 
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those of us who are over fifty years of age can attest on the basis of our 
experience. At least we can neither ignore nor deny the many great 
changes that have transformed our homes and our cities, and with them 
our civilization. 
Many of the recent technological inventions that have entered into 
our lives have undoubtedly made the world a better place to live in and 
to raise our children, at least materially. It seems however at least equally 
true on the other hand, that more than a few of the new technological 
processes and products have occasioned serious problems because, 
almost certainly, they have made life more difficult, not to say very 
precarious, for a sizeable number of human beings, for their families 
and society at large, not to say even for the whole of humanity as it 
looks toward the future. The powerful but awesome means of destruction 
in the world's nuclear arsenals are a constant reminder of the dangers 
that loom ahead in the horizon, unless leaders of nations find ways of 
settling international disputes peacefully. Less universal and physically 
destructive perhaps, but still rather serious to individuals involved are 
the difficulties affecting persons, their families and whole societies as 
a result of painful and at times unjust dislocations and unemployment 
which follow poorly planned, as well as impersonal substitutions of 
working people with automated equipment in factories and business. 
This is particularly so when the people involved have no other means 
of being gainfully employed and of making an honest living. Obviously 
in some cases the ensuing harm has been more psychological, moral or 
spiritual in nature, but certainly not the less serious simply because less 
observable, at least immediately. This situation requires that philosophi- 
cally minded thinkers, as well as other concerned persons, reflect regu- 
larly on, examine and, if necessary, revise their understanding and 
attitudes towards technology and towards its various applications, in at 
least the more critica1 areas of human exitenbce. Only by means of 
careful and repeated investigations of the premises on which rest their 
views and attitudes on this matter can men rationally insure that one of 
their most potent creations will be of real service to mankind rather 
than a means to enslaving and destroying it in its immediate future. 
Al1 technology, including that of our century, as a special instance 
of one of the intellectual virtues', namely art, is obviously a human 
1. See ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics VI, c .  4 ,  1140a9-10, tr. Martin Ostwald, Indianapolis, 
The Library of Liberal Arts, 1962, vol. 2, p. 151. 
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creation or work2. As originally designed it is still intended, presumably 
at least, to contribute to, and to enhance, the material basis of man's 
well-being, full development and eventual happiness. Keeping this in 
mind and in order to determine correctly the proper value and limits of 
technology, specifically modern technology, we must always measure 
it, as well as its distinct applications, techniques and numerous products, 
against the correct understanding of ourselves and of the whole human 
family, as much as possible and without ignoring the specifically distinct 
kind of being within the visible universe that man is. One can only agree 
that «the standards by which men make their choices out of the greater 
freedom which is theirs» as a result of much of modern technology 
«must be set by people with that sort of insight into human nature 
which» only a sound philosophy of the human person and a sound 
humanism is able to give3. To this thought of the proper insight into 
human nature we shall turn our thoughts after some reflections on 
technology itself. 
If by the latter we uriderstand not simply «the concentrated study 
of the way in which things may be made or changedn by man, but 
likewise their actual production and the products themselves apressed 
into human s e r v i c e ~ ~ ,  we: then obviously have to acknowledge that it is 
not an entirely new phenomenon in the life of mankind. Clearly history 
tells us that already in tlie Ancient World, as well as «more strikingly 
during the Middle Ages in Western Europe there was a continua1 pro- 
gress in the development of te~hnology»~. As a consequence however, 
of a greatly increased amd qualitatively superior scientific knowledge 
of the forces, materials and objects of the physical world achieved in 
the more recent centuries, technology has been greatly changed, not to 
say well-nigh transformed. Al1 of this was the result even of an increa- 
singly closer associatiori with science. Technology can therefore today 
be understood and even~ defined as «the new knowledge of science ... 
2.  Modern technology is moreover a product of modern science, something that has given rise 
to a paradox noted by not a few observers: «the presence of mind is everywhere in the formation of 
this science, and yet the results of this science were alleged as evidence for some general mechanistic 
view of the world ... a paradox ... of our modern epoch» (William BARRET, Death of the Soid, Garden 
City, N .  Y., Anchor PresslDoubleday, 1986, p. 6 ) .  
3.  C. A. COULSON, Science, Technology and the Christian, New York, Abingdon Press, 1960, 
p. 65. 
4. Ibid., p.  17. 
5 .  John G. BURKE, The New Technology and Human Values, Belmont, California, Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, l1972, p. 5. 
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pressed into human ~ e r v i c e » ~ .  It may be named simply «applied 
science». With justification due to the fact that «the interaction between 
science and technology reached its full flower in the twentieth cen tury~~,  
a writer describes «the new technology» as «the interaction between 
basic science -that is pure research- and applied science»$. However, 
though «it reached its full flower in the twentieth century», the 
beginnings of the «new technology» take us back to the aseventeenth 
century. For that was the century that created Modern Science and its 
accompanying technology~~. Since then both science and technology 
have become two of the main adriving forces within modern civi- 
lizationI0. The association between science and technology has held ever 
more strongly since the seventeenth century, although as recent history 
shows, not so strikingly as until the start of this century. On account of 
this ever closer association since the rise of modern science, an author 
already cited writes: «the hyphen in the compound expression "science- 
technology does not signify the compounding of two independent 
realities only externally related: it expresses a single historical reality 
of which the two names denote merely different aspects"»". To this it 
must be added that, as it might have reasonably been expected, «the 
more advanced and developed science becomes, the closer its alliance 
becomes with its own technol~gy»'~. The result has been that frequently 
in our times both science and technology are understood by many as a 
«single human project»13. 
Technology therefore, with modern science as its basis and souree, 
is one of the main driving forces of the modern world with its dinstincti- 
ve civilization. This is especially true of nations in the Western world 
and to a lesser extent in most other nations on the way to becoming 
industrialized. As exemplified before, the processes, techniques and 
products of modern technology practically surround us on every side. 
They can be read about in the daily newspaper. Frequently they have 
become part of everyday existence, of businesses and government. 
6 .  COULSON, Science 17. 
7. BURKE, The New Technology 6 .  
8. Ibid., p. 1. 
9 .  BARRET, Death XIV. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., p. 73. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
Sometimes they contribute significantly to our health, entertainment and 
over al1 well-being. Yet there are also instances when inventions threaten 
to diminish the quality of life and even continued existence of indivi- 
duals and of civilization. 
Admittedly therefore, modern technology is in many ways beneficia1 
and enriching of lives and of civilization. But at the same time and in 
not negligible ways, it appears also to be somewhat diminishing and 
destructive of lives and of our environment. Understandably a 
consequence of this is that sensitive and thoughtful human beings adopt 
distinct, occasionally ambiguous or even totally antithetical attitudes 
towards technology in general and towards applications of it in certain 
areas, spoken sometimes simply as «technologies,» e. g. bio-technology, 
military technology. 
Of those dinstinct attitudes towards technology we mention first the 
unabashedly optimistic stand of people to whom it is undeniably clear 
that «in science and invention lies our hope» for the future of the human 
familyI4. Such people are led to such a conclusion due to technology 
having been generally well received even «in places where the science 
from which it now stems is even u n k n o w n ~ ' ~ .  The impression here is 
that technology is well-nigh universal in its acceptance by people in 
almost al1 over the world. Under such conditions it may reasonably be 
argued that «perhaps tecl~nology is to be the buttress against disinte- 
gration and the centre-pin of man's re~toration»'~. Thinkers who take 
this first position without any qualifications are generally of a frame of 
mind that at least implicitly inclines, or is even committed, to some 
sort of atheism or to a supposedly scientific materialism. Their thinking 
on the question at hand has been named by some «technological 
h~manism»'~ .  In support of the assurance that technology offers the best, 
if not the only meaningful, hope for the future, its proponents point to 
these three chief techn,ological operations: a) a large number of 
technologies are clearly aimed at raising the material standard of living; 
b) a few others at increasing leisure or at least eliminating dull and 
innecessary work; c)  sorne are aimed at replacing other technol~gies'~. 
A second group of thinkers views the matter in a different frame of 
14. COULSON, Science 100. 
15. Ibid., p. 97. 
16. Ibid,  p. 94. 
17. Ibid., p. 99. 
18. lbid 
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mind, indeed an opposite one. Their attention focuses on the undeniably 
difficult and sometimes well-nigh unsurmountable problems that have 
followed on the heels of otherwise astonishing inventions of modern 
technology. They cannot excuse or ignore the large scale destruction 
and harm which have already occurred and which continue to threaten 
the whole human species, and indeed the entire world by means of the 
awesome nuclear weapons in the hands of sometimes unscrupulous men 
of ambition and power. According to these sensitive thinkers we have 
no choice but to insist that «the centers of our fear now are technology 
and science»lg. They observe that when both joined together in modern 
times «the results were as devastating as they now almost evidently 
are»20. Consequently and not altogether irrationally «they revolt from 
the evil they seen2'. To them technology has at the very least «a slightly 
dirty connotation, with an undertone of not being quite n i ~ e » ~ ~ .  
Obviously the heretofore outlined positions are two extremes given 
in distinct variations in the writings of the various thinkers who espouse 
them. On the one side are the thinkers committed at least implicitly, to 
a progressivist philosophy that looks forward to a future of unending 
human and material progress. They look upon the enshrinement of 
science and technology as «the necessary and sufficient condition of 
the material comfort and happiness for al1 of m a n k i n d ~ ~ ~ .  The only way 
open to «human progreSS» is ethrough science and t e ~ h n o l o g y » ~ ~  
because only «in science and invention lies our hope» for the future of 
civilization, at least in its supposedly more advanced western f ~ r m ~ ~ .  
The contrary extremely pessimistic position asserts that this century's 
world wars with a threatened third nuclear holocaust, as well as and 
even more, the almost universal decline in family, moral and spiritual 
values, suggest an opposite solution. Seeing that the results of modern 
technology are «as devastating as they are  no^»^^, they conclude that 
«the systematic organization of society along scientific and technological 
lines ... is the most dangerous threat to human va1ue . s~~~ .  In a manner 
which is clearly consistent they complain that «in accepting the grad- 
19. BARRET, Denth XIV. 
20. COLLSON, Science 44. 
21. Ibicl, 
22. Ibid., p. 47. 
23 .  BURKE, The New Technology 7. 
24. Ibicl. 
25. COULSON, Science 100. 
26. Ibirl., p. 44 
27. BURKE, The New Technology 8 .  
ual and pervasive encroachment of technocracy ... the adult generation 
has abdicated its moral respon~ibility»~~. Less extreme but up to a point 
identificable with the second position is the posture of persons willing 
to recognize many of the benefits and advantages which have accrued 
from technology, but who yet on the whole exhibit an equivoca1 attitude 
compounded of suspicion, ignorance and misunderstanding of the ac- 
tual nature of t e~hno logy~~ .  For in addition to its power for good, modern 
technology appears to them a source of a terrible power for immea- 
surable harm and evil which men are seemingly incapable of controlling 
adequately. Hence they see no choice but to be most fearful of it. These 
same persons are generally ignorant of the actual nature and of the 
accomplishments of the science at the basis of technology, and may 
have a consequent feeling that it has made a strong case for atheism or 
at least that it has made God unnecessary30. Moreover without the correct 
understanding of material reality, they fail to see that material things 
are basically good, and that they were created by God for the well- 
being of mankind as their secondary purpose. For that reason they will 
have nothing to do with it3I. 
Fortunately we need not choose exclusively between the two extre- 
me alternatives, or their variations, for there is a third intermediate 
attitude, more sensible, balanced, realistic and rational. Without 
forgetting that unless properly harnessed «the machine can devalue 
human l i f e ~ ~ ~ ,  as well as bring untold devastation and destruction, 
physical, moral and spiritual, this balanced posture acknowledges that 
«the machine has something to give  LIS»^^, indeed that «the machine is 
a great moral e d u c a t o r ~ ~ ~ .  It is fully cognizant that «modern technology 
may have made us more secure against the hazards of non-human nature, 
but it has left us much more vulnerable to the hazards of human nature, 
expressing themselves in, human conflicts and human purposelessness»35. 
Al the same time however, aware of the power of technology for both 
good and evil, the thinlcers who espouse it do not yield to the radical 
despair of an irrational pessimism, nor do they place undue confidence 
28. Ibid. 
J 29. COWLSON, Science 48. 
30. Ibid., p. 50. 
31. Ibid, p. 105. 
32. Ibid, p. 55. 
33. Ibid, p. 58. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid., p. 84. 
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in an equally unthinking technological humanism. They rather conclude 
and defend that «the machine is for man, not man for the m a c h i n e ~ ~ ~ .  
Science and technology are fundamentally good, and they should always 
be developed and utilized for the actual well-being of mankind, 
collectively as well as individually. As a requirement to that end they 
assert that modern man must renounce the widely-spread view of the 
world linked to a «scientific materialkm» which as a matter of fact has 
ruled as «the de facto mentality of the West in the three and a half 
centuries» that followed the rise of modern ~ c i e n c e ~ ~ .  Men have to eease 
viewing themselves, as well as others, in simply materialistic, financia1 
and economic t e r m ~ ~ ~ .  «Science and technology can achieve great 
results; they can spread goodwill and tolerante», but only if we have 
«the proper view of m a n ~ ~ ~ .  Only those who have «a worthy view of 
m a n ~ ~ ( '  can see that «it is a mistake to foresee the future by estimating 
and projecting the rate and direction of technological changm4' ,  
exclusively of al1 else. But also they cannot fail to see clearly that «it is 
obvious that without enormous technological change we can neither 
feed, house nor clothe the vastly increased population of the twenty- 
first ~ e n t u r y » ~ ~ .  Obviously with this more balanced third position 
technology is understood and appreciated as an important distinct 
instance of the intellectual virtue which, after Aristotle, the Mediaeval 
Schoolmen saw as the recta ratio f a ~ t i b i l i u m ~ ~ .  The position sees also 
clearly that «technology alone is not s u f f i c i e n t ~ ~ ~ .  
Let us now briefly reflect on the proper and worthy view of man 
insisted on a moment ago. Certainly it is not the view proposed by any 
and al1 anthropocentric humanisms, whether atheistic or non-theistic. 
Such humanisms understand man as no more than just another physical 
entity, endowed at most with a life only quantitatively higher than that 
found in plants or in brute animals of possibly a gregarious nature and 
36. Ibid., p. 61. 
37. BARRET, Death 7. 
38. COULSON, Science 102. 
39. lbid., pp. 102-103. 
40. Ibicl., p. 104. 
41. J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLY, 1n the Service o f  Man, Chicago, Henry Rcgnery Company, 1967, 
p. 20. 
42. Ibid. 
43. «Every art ... is concerned with making under the guidance of reason» (St. THOMAS AQCINAS, 
Comntentary on the Nichomachean Ethics VI, lect. 3, tr. G. 1. Litzinger, Chicago, Hcnry Rcgnery 
Company, 1964, p. 555). 
44. Cou~sox, Science 101. 
~ - -- 
with no higher need or relations than those which are purely physical 
and financial. Actually the case is that man's complete nature includes 
also, and above all, a distinctly human or rational component, whereby 
rnan is possessed of an immaterial intellect and will that enable him to 
be open, as it were, to the whole realm of being and to al1 that is good. 
This means that present within rnan and constituting him essentially 
there is a life-principle or soul, spiritual in nature and consequently 
intrinsically independent for some of its operations and in its basic being 
from the body and its several organs. For that reason the human soul, 
and with it the whole man, may look forward to a life and destiny beyond 
the grave45. Such a conception of man's nature goes hand in hand with 
the added acknowledgment that rnan is not his own maker or creator, 
individually or as a species. Nor is he simply the product of blind 
evolutionary forces. This can only mean that man is not the supreme 
First Being. Not himself the divine First Being, rnan as well as al1 else 
that is not that First Being owe their being to a supreme First Source, 
none other than the First Being or God. Within such an understanding 
of rnan vis-a-vis the world and God, humans have to be conceived as 
the noblest and most exalted beings within the whole of visible creation 
and as its center and proximate end, but never as the absolute and 
ultimate source, center and end of al1 of creation. This can only be the 
supreme First Being who, as the radical source of al1 existence, can 
alone be that absolute center and ultimate end of al1 that He has brought 
into existence through a generous and altogether free act of creation. 
Such is the view of mal1 vis-a-vis God and the rest of reality put forth 
and defended by an integral humanism which cannot be but a theocentric 
h ~ m a n i s m ~ ~ .  
On account of its rational and correct understanding of God in 
classically theistic ternis, an integral theocentric humanism is able to 
look upon technology jn a rational and balanced position. In so doing 
it avoids the extremes of a) either at least practically condemning 
technology as an outright evil or b) of an uncritical progressivism that 
45. Martin VASKE, A Philosophy qf Morality, Omaha, Creighton University Press, 1980, pp. 61 
7-9. 
46. Walter W. ARTUS, Christian Humanism: Theocentric Basis and Antecedents, in El Hurna- 
nismo y la Metafisica Cristiana en la Actualidad (Segundo Congreso Mundial de Filosofía Cristia- 
na, 1986), Monterrey-Mexico 1988, vol. 2, pp. 507-510. For a more extended discussion of this 
humanism see Jacques MARITAIN, Integral H~iinanism, tr. Joseph W. Evans, New York, Charles 
Scribners's Sons, 1968. 
3 06 WALTER W. ARTUS 
sees technology as a panacea for al1 of mankind's problems and needs, 
leading to man's total and perfect fulfillment. Its classical theistic 
conception of God is in basic accord witk the Judeo-Christian idea of 
God. An infinite and supremely perfect First Being who is also the 
essence and fullness of goodness, God is the creator of man, of the whole 
world of material being, and indeed of al1 finite being. Consequently 
the material entities of the world, as well as the matter out of which 
they are constituted entitatively, are fundamentally or metaphysically 
good, simply because their Creator is the essence of goodness. They 
are and remain so notwithstanding innumerable physical evils which 
sometimes accompany them due to their finite character, or often result 
in some way from also innumerable and more serious moral evils 
brought about by the misuse of their free will by intellectual or rational 
beings, as are angels and men. Not only are therefore material things 
-as well as al1 other things created originally by Him who is Goodness 
Itself-, metaphysycally good but, in addition since God could not have 
created them except with or for Himself as their highest ultimate end, 
He created al1 non-rational material beings for man as their proximate 
and secondary end. Without an intellectual nature needed to reach their 
fulfillment in God directly through knowledge and love, other material 
beings will do so vicariously in the persons of those human beings who 
do reach in God their own ultimate fulfillment. This thought was 
expressed repeatedly particularly by Christian thinkers inspired by a 
conviction that man was created to the image and likeness of their 
CreatoP7. 
With such thoughts concerning the production and finality of matter, 
and with it of the material things formed out of it, at the heart of his 
theocentric humanism, an integral humanist cannot but be deeply 
appreciative of technology and its inventions, provided they only be 
developed and directed towards the realization of man's authentic well- 
being in pursuit of his ultimate end. Men ought never of course, to 
place in their creations their exclusive and total hope for their eventual 
47. One of our Mediaeval Ancestors wrote: «Et propterea indubitanter verum est, quod sumus 
finis omnium eorum quae sunt; et omnia corporalia facta sunt ad humanum obsequium, ut cx illis 
omnibus accendatur homo ad amandum et laudandum Factorem universorum~ ( S t .  BONAVENTL'RE, 
Braviloquiutn 11 4, in Opera Otnnia, Quaracchi, Typographia Coleggi S. Bonaventurae, 1891, vol. 
5, p. 222). The Majorcan Ramon LLULL has the same thought: «...ideo est anima, ut sit homo, qui 
serviat Dco, et ut corporales creaturae serviant homini, et ipsum juvent ad serviendum Deo» (Lihcr 
de Homine, part 2,  in Raymundi Lulli Opera, Mainz, John Henry Haeffner, 1737, vol. 6 ,  p. 481). 
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total fulfillment, or even for the solution of al1 their physical, mental, 
social, moral and spiritual problems. But neither ought men to despise 
or unduly fear technology as simply another irremediable source of what 
is only, or principally, evil. The reason for al1 of this of course, is that 
an integral humanist is certain that the material things and forces man 
utilizes rationally -as well as the products of his own art and techno- 
logy for which he uses th~ose material forces and things-, are basically 
good. They have also been ultimately created and placed at his disposal, 
as it were, as the material basis of his well-being and happiness. Man 
must of course, use them properly so that they help him to achieve his 
ultimate end and fulfillrnent. Convinced that the world is God's work, 
that when God created it He saw that it was good because, He, its source, 
as an Infinite Good, an integral humanist can never despise or simply 
ignore material things. How can he when he knows that «God made 
them and enjoyed them: and since they could be the vehicle of His 
s p i r i t ? ~ ~ ~  For the same reiason he can «not believe that anyone who really 
believes this can ever hate technology and machines, just because they 
are m a ~ h i n e s > > ~ ~ .  
Walter W. ARTUS 
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8000 Utopia Parkway 
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48. COULSON, Science 54. 
49. Ibid. 
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Summary 
The proliferation of the techniques and products of modern technology have turned 
our civilization into a technological one. Undoubtedly many technological creations have 
become beneficia1 for at least a good part of the human family. However, many others 
are harmful and even destructive of the physical, psychological and spiritual well-being 
of man. Sometimes technology has altered, and even diminished the quality of the 
individual's life and that of the family and of society. As a result it sometimes seems to 
interfere with the biological foundations of human life itself. Therefor'e, philosophers 
are right in formulating the serious questions that need to be answered in order to con- 
trol this tremendous technological power for the benefit of the human race. 
One of the most powerful human creations in the whole of man's history, technology 
was designed, and is still so considered, as an improvement of the material foundation 
of his well-being, complete development and ultimate happiness. For that reason, its 
value and limitations must be correctly determined with an adequate understanding and 
appreciation of ourselves in front of the totality of reality. Such understanding can only 
come from an integral humanism that correctly sees man as the most noble of beings 
in the universe, but whose dignity is ultimately derived from the Supreme Being who, 
as such, is also Goodness in its fullness. 
